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Abstract
Elicitability has recently been discussed as a desirable property for risk
measures. Kou and Peng (2014) showed that an elicitable distortion risk
measure is either a Value-at-Risk or the mean. We give a concise alternative
proof of this result, and discuss the conflict between comonotonic additivity
and elicitability.
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1 Distortion risk measures
We consider a standard atomless probability space (Ω,F ,P), and denote by
D the set of distribution functions on R. A law invariant risk measure ρ is a
mapping from Dρ to [−∞,+∞], where Dρ ⊂ D. Write
H = {h : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] : h is non-decreasing, h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1}.
Definition 1.1. A distortion risk measure ρ : Dρ → R is defined by
ρ(F ) =
∫ 0
−∞
(h(1− F (x))− 1)dx+
∫ ∞
0
h(1− F (x))dx, (1.1)
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where Dρ is set of some F ∈ D such that (1.1) is well-defined, and h ∈ H is called
the distortion function of ρ.
The two most popular risk measures used in practice, Value-at-Risk (VaR)
and Expected Shortfall (ES), are both distortion risk measures; for a recent dis-
cussion on VaR and ES, see Embrechts et al. (2014). We refer to Wang et al.
(1997), Acerbi (2002), Kusuoka (2001) and Kou and Peng (2014) for more details
and examples of distortion risk measures. Distortion risk measures are closely re-
lated to L-statistics (linear combinations of rank statistics, introduced for robust
estimation); see Chapter 3 of Huber and Ronchetti (2009).
2 Elicitability
Elicitability was originally introduced as a property of set-valued functions.
For consistency, we consider ρ : Dρ → 2
R as set-valued functions. This includes,
for example, the case of quantiles, which may be an interval. In most cases, each
value of ρ is a set with exactly one element as in Section 1, and we simply treat
them as mappings to R.
Definition 2.1. A scoring function S : R× R → [0,∞) is called consistent for ρ
with respect to Dρ, if
E(S(t, X)) 6 E(S(x,X)) (2.1)
for all t ∈ ρ(F ) and all x ∈ R, where X is a random variable with distribution
F ∈ Dρ. We speak of strict consistency of S if equality in (2.1) implies x ∈ ρ(X).
The functional ρ is elicitable (with respect to Dρ) if there exists a strictly consistent
scoring function for it.
Roughly speaking, the forecasting of an elicitable risk measure can be eval-
uated using a score function, whereas there is no clear criterion to evaluate the
forecasting of a non-elicitable risk measure. Arguments for the desirability of
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elicitability for risk management and other statistical sciences can be found in
Gneiting (2011) and Ziegel (2015).
3 Elicitable distortion risk measures
A necessary condition for a functional to to be elicitable are convex level sets,
that is, if t ∈ ρ(F ) ∩ ρ(G), then
t ∈ ρ(λF + (1− λ)G),
whenever λF + (1 − λ)G ∈ Dρ for λ ∈ [0, 1]; see Osband (1985). Develop-
ments on risk measures with convex level sets can be found in Weber (2006),
Lambert (2012), Ziegel (2015), Bellini and Bignozzi (2014), Kou and Peng (2014)
and Delbaen et al. (2014). The work of Steinwart et al. (2014) shows that convex
level sets are also a sufficient criterion for elicitability under some weak regularity
assumptions on ρ; see also Lambert (2012).
The work of Weber (2006) investigated monetary risk measures with convex
level sets under some additional regularity assumptions in a context of dynamic
consistency. Under his assumptions, convex level sets are necessary and sufficient
for the risk measure to be a shortfall risk measure. In the case of convex risk
measures, Delbaen et al. (2014) show that Weber’s (2006) assumptions are equiv-
alent to the weak compactness property. They extend his result by showing that
all convex risk measures with convex level sets are necessarily generalized short-
fall risk measures. Bellini and Bignozzi (2014) considered monetary elicitable risk
measures based on the results of Weber (2006). They use a more restrictive def-
inition of elicitability by imposing regularity conditions on the scoring function
S, which in turn ensures that Weber’s assumptions are satisfied. It was shown
that (1) a monetary risk measure is elicitable only if it is a shortfall risk measure;
(2) a convex risk measure is elicitable if and only if it is a convex shortfall; (3)
a coherent risk measure is elicitable if and only if it is an expectile. In the case
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of coherent risk measures it is possible to show directly from the Kusuoka repre-
sentation (Kusuoka, 2001), that the only coherent risk measures with convex level
sets are expectiles; see Ziegel (2015). While it is possible to apply Weber’s (2006)
results to distortion risk measures, this requires unnecessary additional assump-
tions, which can be avoided by exploiting the structure of distortion risk measures
directly.
The following result (Kou and Peng, 2014, Theorem A.1) characterizes dis-
tortion risk measures with convex level sets, which leads to a full characterization
of elicitable distortion risk measures. We provide an alternative proof of this result,
which is substantially shorter and less technical.
Theorem 3.1 (Kou and Peng (2014)). Let D∗ be the class of distributions with
finite support and ρ be a distortion risk measure with distortion function h ∈ H
as defined at (1.1) whose restriction to D∗ has convex level sets. Then h is either
the identity on [0, 1] or it is of the form
h(x) =


0, x ∈ [0, α),
c, x = α,
1, x ∈ (α, 1],
(3.1)
for some α, c ∈ [0, 1]. If α = 0 or α = 1, then c = 0 or c = 1, respectively.
Proof. Let 0 < x < y, λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
ρ((1− λ)δx + λδy) = x+ h(λ)(y − x),
where δx is the Dirac measure at the point x ∈ R. In particular, ρ(δ1) = 1. Let
λ ∈ [0, 1] such that h(λ) > 0. All 0 < x < y such that ρ((1 − λ)δx + λδy) are
characterized by the equation
y =
(
1−
1
h(λ)
)
x+
1
h(λ)
.
In order to obtain x < y, we need to choose x < 1, which then implies y > 1.
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Convexity of level sets on D∗ now implies for all p ∈ [0, 1], 0 < x < 1 < y
chosen as described before, that
1 = ρ
(
p((1− λ)δx + λδy) + (1− p)δ1
)
= x+ h(1− p(1− λ))(1− x) + h(λp)
(
1−
1
h(λ)
)
(1− x),
hence
h(λ) = h(λ)h(1− (1− λ)p) + (1− h(λ))h(λp), λ, p ∈ [0, 1]. (3.2)
Let λ0 := inf{t | h(t) > 0}. Assume that λ0 > 0, and let λ ∈ (λ0, 1]. Then,
h(λ) > 0 and for p ∈ [0, p0), we have h(λp) = 0. Equation (3.2) now implies that
h(t) = 1 for t ∈ (1 − p0(1 − λ), 1] = (1 − λ0(1 − λ)/λ, 1]. As this holds for all
λ ∈ (λ0, 1], we obtain h(t) = 1 for t ∈ (λ0, 1], hence h is of the form (3.1).
Assume form now on that λ0 = 0, i.e. h > 0 on (0, 1]. If there is λ
′ ∈ (0, 1)
such that h(λ′) = 1, pick λ < λ′ and p ∈ [0, 1] such that λ′ = 1 − p(1− λ). Then
(3.2) implies that h(λ) = 1, hence h = 1 on (0, 1], and h is of the form (3.1).
So suppose now that 0 < h < 1 on (0, 1). Integrating (3.2) over p ∈ [0, 1] we
obtain for λ ∈ (0, 1)
h(λ) = h(λ)
∫ 1
0
h(1− (1− λ)p)dp+ (1− h(λ))
∫ 1
0
h(λp)dp
=
h(λ)
1− λ
∫ 1
λ
h(x)dx+
1− h(λ)
λ
∫ λ
0
h(x)dx
=
h(λ)
1− λ
(g(1)− g(λ)) +
1− h(λ)
λ
g(λ),
where g(λ) =
∫ λ
0
h(x)dx. Or, equivalently
h(λ)
(
λ−
λ
1− λ
(g(1)− g(λ)) +
1
λ
g(λ)
)
= g(λ). (3.3)
The function g is continuous on (0, 1), hence (3.3) shows that also h is continuous
in (0, 1). But this implies in turn that g is continuously differentiable in (0, 1).
Because h > 0, we obtain that λ− λ
1−λ
(g(1)− g(λ)) + 1
λ
g(λ) > 0 on (0, 1). Hence,
h(λ) =
g(λ)
λ− λ
1−λ
(g(1)− g(λ)) + 1
λ
g(λ)
,
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which implies the continuous differentiability of h on (0, 1).
Differentiating (3.2) with respect to p yields
−h(λ)h′(1− p(1− λ))(1− λ) + (1− h(λ))h′(λp)λ = 0.
Let H = {λ ∈ (0, 1) : h′(λ) > 0}, obviously non-empty. We obtain, by putting
p = 1, that h(λ) = λ for λ ∈ H . As h′ is continuous, H is an open set; therefore
h′(λ) = 1 for λ ∈ H, which along with the continuity of h′ further implies H =
(0, 1), that is, h(λ) = λ on (0, 1).
Theorem 3.1 implies that an elicitable distortion risk measure with respect
to any set containing D∗ has to be either a quantile or the mean. Since distortion
risk measures are continuous with respect to the Wasserstein distance and are
translation-invariant, one can easily see that if a distortion risk measure has convex
level sets on all bounded absolutely continuous distributions, then it has to have
convex level sets on D∗.
If h is the identity on [0, 1], then ρ is the mean, which is elicitable with
respect to the class of all integrable probability distributions; see Savage (1971)
and Banerjee et al. (2005). If h = c1{α} + 1(α,1], then ρ is an α-quantile, which
is elicitable to the class of all absolutely continuous probability distributions; see
Thomson (1979) and Gneiting (2011).
Strictly speaking, a left-quantile (or right-quantile or a convex combination of
the two) is not elicitable with respect to D∗ despite its convex level sets. However,
we do not believe that this is a problem in applications where quantile forecasts
are to be evaluated and compared because in the case of distributions with positive
density functions on their support, quantiles are unique.
In summary, for all practical purposes Value-at-Risk (quantiles) and the mean
are elicitable distortion risk measures and they are the only ones. This charac-
terization was given in Kou and Peng (2014, Theorem 2.1) in a slightly different
form (elicitability is treated for single-valued functions in the latter paper; there
is no essential difference).
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Remark 3.1. We observe from the proof that it is already sufficient to choose
D∗ as the class of three-point distributions. Hence, any distortion risk measures
except for the mean and Value-at-Risk are not elicitable with respect to bounded
discrete distributions.
4 Discussion
Roughly speaking, there is a fundamental conflict between distortion and
elicitability. This is due to the fact that comonotonic additivity, which is the
essential property for distortion risk measures, requires linearity on the inverse
distribution functions, that is,
ρ(λF−1(U) + (1− λ)G−1(U)) = λρ(F−1(U)) + (1− λ)ρ(G−1(U)), λ > 0, (4.1)
where U is a uniform random variable on [0, 1] and F and G are two distribution
functions in Dρ. On the other hand, elicitability requires convex level sets on the
level of distribution functions, that is,
ρ(λF + (1− λ)G) = λρ(F ) + (1− λ)ρ(G), λ ∈ (0, 1), (4.2)
where F and G are two distributions functions in Dρ such that ρ(F ) = ρ(G) (note
that here ρ is treated as a functional on Dρ). Imposing both requirements is very
restrictive as demonstrated in Section 3. Note that condition (4.1) for all F and
G leads to Choquet integrals, whereas condition (4.2) for all F and G leads to
expected utility functions (von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem); such observa-
tion leads to the dual theory of risk preference in Yaari (1987) and Schmeidler
(1989). The intersection of both types of functionals is apparently only the mean.
Elicitability only requires (4.2) for F and G such that ρ(F ) = ρ(G); this allows the
Value-at-Risk (which does not belong to the class of expected utility functions) to
still be generally elicitable.
Elicitability and comonotonic additivity both have their own justifications
for applications, just like other properties considered in the literature, such as
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robustness and convexity. Depending on specific needs of the practical situation,
some requirements may be more important than others. It appears that there
is no risk measure that is recommendable in all situations; one should carefully
choose the risk measure to use and know its limitations.
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